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____________ 
  
O P I N I O N 
____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
In the early morning hours of August 26, 2005, off-
duty police officer Terrence Flomo was shot to death while he 
sat in his car near the intersection of 20th Street and Cecil B. 
Moore Avenue in North Philadelphia. The Commonwealth 
charged William Johnson and Mumin Slaughter with murder 
based on witness identifications and forensic testimony. The 
shooting occurred after Flomo had stopped his car and 
solicited Brenda Bowens, a prostitute and Slaughter’s and 
Johnson’s long-time drug customer. 
 
At trial, the jury acquitted both defendants of first-
degree murder, but convicted Slaughter on third-degree 
murder and criminal conspiracy. It failed to reach a verdict on 
any remaining charges as to Johnson.  
 
At Johnson’s retrial, the prosecution introduced a 
statement that Slaughter had given police that implicated 
Johnson. Everyone agrees that this violated Johnson’s right to 
confront witnesses against him, and Johnson now argues that 
the error caused him prejudice warranting habeas relief. 
Separately, Johnson urges that the prosecutor’s calling 
Slaughter to testify knowing that Slaughter would invoke his 
Fifth Amendment privilege denied him of due process. For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of Johnson’s habeas petition. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
Johnson’s second trial began on May 28, 2009 and 
lasted four days. The Commonwealth’s witnesses included 
Dr. Lieberman, the medical examiner, who testified that 
Flomo was shot in his right elbow and wrist area, as well as 
his chest. He opined that the gunshot to the chest caused 
significant damage to his liver, right lower lung, heart, and 
left lung, and as such was the “more immediately fatal of all 
three gunshot wounds.” R.579.1 Lieberman also testified that 
the muzzle of the gun was fired from two-and-one-half to 
three feet from Flomo. He opined that the entries were on the 
right side of his body, “including the shot that actually 
kill[ed] him, the one to his heart, the most immediately fatal 
one.” R.595. Given the scenario of Flomo’s sitting in the 
driver’s seat of the car, Lieberman testified that the shots 
could only have come from the front passenger’s side of the 
vehicle.  
 
Further, a firearms expert testified that two particles of 
unburnt gunshot residue were recovered from the front 
passenger’s side armrest, indicating that the gun was within 
three feet of the passenger’s side window. 
 
There was no physical evidence, however, linking 
Johnson to the crime scene. The Commonwealth offered two 
eyewitnesses, Brenda Bowens and Nora Williams, each of 
whom implicated Slaughter and Johnson and identified 
Johnson as the passenger’s side shooter. The Commonwealth 
                                              
1 Citations to the record, unless otherwise indicated, 
refer to the PDF page number of Part 4 of Johnson’s state 
court record per the ECF docket entry dated April 21, 2015. 
5 
 
also put Slaughter on the stand and, when he refused to 
testify, introduced the statement he gave to police implicating 
Johnson. Because Slaughter’s statement was admitted 
erroneously, and the remaining two identifications are central 
to our analysis as to harmless error, we recount their 
testimony in some detail. 
 
A. Brenda Bowens 
 To support her crack addiction, Bowens worked as a 
prostitute in the area of 20th Street and Cecil B. Moore 
Avenue. Slaughter, whom she knew as “Muk,” and Johnson, 
whom she knew as “Juice,” were her drug dealers. R.647. She 
testified that she had known Johnson for “five, six years,” and 
Slaughter for “ten, twelve.” R.647. In fact, she “would see 
them every day” because she “always bought crack from 
them.” R.647–48.  
 
On the morning of the murder, Bowens reported being 
solicited by a man near the intersection of 20th and Cecil B. 
Moore. She declined because she intended to go into a nearby 
house to get high.2 She crossed the street and reported the 
encounter to Slaughter and Johnson, who were walking up 
                                              
2 At least two houses on the street functioned as crack 
houses, including the house in which Bowens testified she 
intended to get high. There was some indication that Johnson 
and Slaughter sold drugs from these houses also, and that 
Bowens and Williams, as well as others, would buy their 
drugs from there. We note that while defense counsel 
objected to some of these questions concerning the nature of 
those houses, other testimony regarding the houses was 
admitted into evidence. 
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Cecil B. Moore Avenue. Bowens then continued to an all-
night convenience store around the corner. Upon her return 
shortly after, she saw the same car that had solicited her 
before. As she approached the house, she “turned around” and 
“[saw] Muk and Juice. Muk’s standing on the driver’s side; 
Juice was on the other side, the passenger[’s] side.” R.632. 
She testified that Johnson was “leaning in the car.” R.689. 
She stated: 
 
I didn’t “see” it happen, but I saw flashes and I 
heard a gunshot, and immediately I ran, because 
that’s what I do. When you see two 
neighborhood drug dealing guys, you run, 
because, you know. I don’t have to go into 
detail. But I ran and started banging on the 
door, [saying] “Let me the hell in.” 
 
R.633. While banging on the door to be let in, she “glanced” 
behind her to “make sure that [she] was . . . out of harm’s 
way.” R.633. She then “heard another shot” and saw the 
“flash again.” R.633. She testified that Johnson, at that point, 
was still standing at the passenger’s side door. She then 
finally was able to enter the house. 
 
At trial, the prosecutor reviewed the entire episode 
using a demonstrative map of the intersection. Bowens 
identified the house she intended to smoke in as well as where 
other events occurred. Bowens also addressed her failure to 
come forward to the police initially: 
 
Q. . . . When you went the second time to 
Homicide, after they’re talking to you and you 
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told them what you saw, what caused you to tell 
them that you saw this? What happened? 
. . . 
A. I was saying that my family was real 
concerned that I was in danger, someone was 
going to kill me and that I needed help. 
 
R.643–44. 
On cross-examination, Bowens was impeached with 
her “severe drug habit,” R.655, and criminal history. Bowens 
admitted to a prior conviction (for which she was sentenced 
to eleven-and-a-half to twenty-three months in jail), to being 
on probation, and to having a bench warrant out for her arrest 
when she gave her statement. She was also impeached with 
her failure to report what she saw to the police and her initial 
refusal to give a statement after she was picked up for 
questioning. Bowens disclosed that, during these 
interrogations, she was “promised” that she would be given 
help with her drug addiction.3 R.663. 
 
Bowens’s perception of the shooting was also 
impeached. While Bowens reported seeing Johnson leaning 
into Flomo’s car, she did not see anything in his hands. 
Bowens admitted that she only glanced in the direction of the 
shooting for what defense counsel characterized as a “mini-
second . . . a flash.” R.687. Defense counsel also impeached 
her with her prior inconsistent statements about the exact 
location of Flomo’s car in the intersection when the shooting 
occurred. Finally, the distance between the shooting and the 
                                              
3 This help came by way of a voluntary prosecution 
and commitment to a drug rehabilitation program. 
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crack house Bowens attempted to enter (and in the vicinity of 
which Bowens reportedly saw the shooting) was, defense 
counsel urged in his closing, approximately 600 feet.4  
 
On re-direct, the prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate 
Bowens on a number of points. He reviewed Bowens’s 
identification of Johnson again: 
 
Q. In terms of that car, and counsel has asked 
you where the car was back and forth. When 
you see the shooting, are you concentrating on 
where the car is? 
A. No, not at all. 
Q. What are you concentrating on? 
A. Me getting away. 
Q. And did you recognize the guys who did it? 
A. Yes 
Q. And who are they? 
A. Juice and Muk. 
Q. And is Juice here now? 
A. Yes, sir. 
. . . 
Q. Point to Juice. 
A. Right there (indicating) 
Q. No doubt in your mind it was them, right? 
. . . 
A. That’s a hard question. It was so many years 
ago, and I done been through so much, sir. I’m 
                                              
4 At trial, the jury was presented with a map of the 
area. The prosecutor said during his closing that, “It’s not 600 
feet. Take the measurement. It’s about 300 and something.” 
R.1215.  
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really honestly going to say that I am not really 
sure. I’m really honestly going to say that I’m 
not really sure. I been through so fucking much. 
I been through so much. 
Q. And I know you’ve been through – Brenda, 
listen to me – 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, 
may we have a break at this point? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Look at me. No. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Excuse me. 
I’m asking the Court. 
THE COURT: No. Well, let me see. Are 
you all right? You all right? 
(Witness crying.) 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, 
perhaps we should take a break.  
THE COURT: We’re going to take a 
break. 
 
R.727–29.  
 
After a brief recess, Bowens testified that she was 
“very tired,” and agreed with the prosecutor that she was 
“emotionally drained” and “want[ed] to get this over with.” 
R.731. She continued, however, and testified again that 
Slaughter and Johnson stood next to Flomo’s car: 
 
Q. Okay. Now, I’m going to ask you this: That 
morning when you were out there and you hear 
the shot, what do you see? 
. . . 
[A.] That morning when I was out there, I see 
Juice and Muk standing at the car. 
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. . . 
Q. You sure of that? 
A. Am I positive, a hundred percent positive? I 
just said I wasn’t. You asked me did I have any 
doubt, and I just said it. I was just – I mean, I’m 
emotionally drained. You all asking me the 
same thing over and over and over again. 
Q. When you made the statement to homicide, 
did you tell them the truth? 
. . . 
[A.] Yes. 
. . . 
Q. When you went to the preliminary hearing – 
remember it was just a judge, no jury, and I was 
there and asked you questions – did you tell that 
judge the truth? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you were here in 2007 before that 
judge and another jury, did you tell this judge 
the truth? 
THE COURT: I was the Judge. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
BY [THE PROSECUTOR]: 
Q. Are you telling us the truth now? 
A. Yes. 
 
R.732–34. The prosecutor then read portions of Bowens’s 
prior consistent statements to the jury, which confirmed the 
essential details of her eyewitness account, including that 
Johnson stood on the passenger’s side of Flomo’s car.5  
                                              
5 Specifically, in her statement to the police, Bowens 
stated, “Juice was standing at the passenger side.” R.737. The 
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prosecutor read other portions of Bowens’s statements which 
also confirmed her testimony, including the following: 
 
Q. First page. The fourth Q, and I’ll read the 
question, okay? Tell me if you’re reading along 
with me. “Can you go on in your own words 
and tell us what you know about the shooting.” 
Do you see that? I’m going to read your answer. 
“I heard one shot. I looked toward C.B. Moore 
Avenue. I saw the car stopped. Muk was 
standing on the driver’s side . . . of the car in the 
street. Juice was standing at the passenger side. 
I seen two flashes go off inside the car. I 
couldn’t see who was shooting. Then I saw 
Muk run away from the car towards the 
sidewalk. That’s when I ran inside the house. I 
didn’t see which way Juice ran.” Did you say 
that? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. That’s what happened? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
. . . 
Q. “Question: Had you spoken to Police Officer 
Flomo prior to him being shot?” Your answer: . 
. . “I didn’t know he was a police officer until 
the next day. I was on the way to the store at 
19th and C.B. Moore. . . . I was crossing the 
street at 20th and Cecil B. Moore. Crossing 
Cecil B. Moore, his car was stopped at the light 
on C.B. Moore facing 21st.” “He said to me, 
‘Hi, baby, what’s up? What you doing?’ I didn’t 
want to be bothered. I just said to him, ‘Get the 
12 
 
 Bowens also testified that she feared for her 
safety. She stated that she had to be “relocated” after 
giving her statement to the police.6 R.649. The 
prosecutor also questioned whether persons in the 
courtroom might have threatened her: 
                                                                                                     
fuck out of here,’ and kept walking. That’s 
when I seen Muk and Juice on C.B. Moore, 
between 19th and 20th. I said to them, ‘Yo, hi. 
What’s up? That guy just tried picking me up.’ 
They kept walking towards 20th Street. I kept 
walking to the store at 19th.”  
That’s what happened? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
. . . 
Q. “Question: How long have you known Muk 
and Juice?” “Answer: I’ve known Muk over ten 
years. I have known Juice about five years.” 
True? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. “Question: Do you know Muk or Juice to 
carry a gun?” “Answer: On occasion I see Muk 
with one. He wears a holster. It’s a black 
holster. The gun was big with a brown handle. I 
never see Juice with one, but I know he has a 
bad temper. He kicks doors in and stuff like 
that.” True? 
A. That’s true. 
R.736-40. 
6 Bowens violated the terms of this relocation by 
returning to the intersection to get high. This occasioned her 
voluntary prosecution and commitment to a rehabilitation 
program. 
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Q. You said you were worried or not 
comfortable about certain people in this room. 
Are you afraid of the defendant’s people and his 
family that are sitting in this room right now? 
A. I’m afraid of everything right now, you 
know. I’m afraid of everything right now. I’m 
very – yeah, very afraid of everything. Not only 
them, but everybody. It’s like everybody out to 
get me. When this shit went down, everybody 
was out to get me. 
. . . 
THE COURT: . . . You want to get off 
the stand; Is that correct? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. I have a life. I’m 
just tired of being badgered. It’s been 
five, four years I’ve been being 
badgered, badgered, badgered. The DA 
been badgering me, other people 
badgering me, everybody badgering me. 
 
R.748–50. She was then briefly recrossed and 
redirected7 before being excused.8  
                                              
7 On this final redirect examination, she broke down in 
tears again:  
Q. Brenda, your life is at stake right now, right? 
A. (No response.) 
Q. Right? Yes or no. 
A. My life is at stake, ever since this stuff went 
down, ever since my name and my face was on 
the news and all that happened. And it’s left me 
hanging like that, you’re damn right. 
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Q. And at the preliminary hearing, that lawyer 
was there every time. 
A. Who? 
Q. At the preliminary hearing when you first 
testified, you were sure of what you said, 
correct? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: You can’t keep 
bouncing me back and forth. I’m going 
crazy. I don’t know nothing now. 
THE COURT: No. Ma’am -- 
THE WITNESS: I don't know nothing 
now. 
THE COURT: Ma’am -- 
THE WITNESS: I don’t know nothing. 
THE COURT: Ma’am, let me ask you a 
question. 
THE WITNESS: I don’t know nothing. 
Only thing I know is that I was on TV. 
Anybody can fucking kill me, anybody. 
Anybody could have killed me. I’m just 
happy to be alive. That’s all. 
(Witness crying.) 
THE WITNESS: Anybody could have 
just killed me. Everybody left me 
hanging – 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor – 
THE WITNESS: – the cops, everybody 
else left me fucking hanging. 
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B. Nora Williams 
The Commonwealth next called Nora Williams, who 
also placed Johnson at the passenger’s side of Flomo’s car 
during the shooting. Williams was also a prostitute who 
worked in the vicinity of 20th Street and Cecil B. Moore 
Avenue and who knew Bowens from having worked there.9  
Williams knew Johnson and Slaughter too and testified that 
she saw them every day on the block. Williams also 
purchased her drugs from them, sometimes several times a 
day.  
 
On the morning of the murder, Williams had just 
finished with a customer when she saw Bowens across the 
                                                                                                     
THE COURT: All right. Please. Are you 
done, Mr. Vega? 
THE WITNESS: Put my face on TV and 
everything. 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: I’m going to be 
done. That’s it. 
THE COURT: Very well. Ma’am, you’re 
excused. 
(Witness crying.) 
R.753-55. 
8 At the time of the second trial, Bowens had been 
sober for two and a half years and had two jobs. 
9 Their relationship, however, was acrimonious. 
Williams testified, “I really don’t care too much about 
[Bowens].” R.774. Bowens, who testified to knowing 
Williams, said that she “didn’t like her” either. R.656. At one 
time, both were in a “fist fight” with each other in the crack 
house on that block. R.657. 
16 
 
street “arguing” with a man in a car.10 R.760. She then saw 
Bowens “walk away.” R.761. She testified that Bowens 
“walked to [Slaughter and Johnson]” and “talked to them for 
a minute” before Bowens left the area. R.762–63. Then 
Williams saw “the car come back around” the block. R.764. 
When asked what happened next, she relayed the following: 
 
Q. When you see the car on 20th, what 
happens? 
A. That’s when I seen Muk and Juice running 
towards the car. 
Q. Okay. When they run towards the car, do 
they get to the car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what happens? 
A. That’s when I just heard – I seen them both 
had guns. I heard the guns start just shooting, 
pop, pop. And I couldn’t really do nothing or 
move or nothing. There was nowhere to hide. 
Q. Okay. Now, I’m going to take you back a 
little. You said you see Muk and Juice coming 
towards the car, right?  
A. Uh-huh, yes. 
Q. Tell me, when Muk gets to the car, what side 
of the car does he go on? 
A. He’s on the driver’s side. 
                                              
10 On cross examination, Williams testified that she 
observed Bowens get into Flomo’s car and argue with Flomo 
in the car itself. On redirect, however, Williams clarified that 
when she first observed Bowens, Bowens was standing near 
Flomo’s car and therefore had only “assumed” Bowens was 
getting out of it. R.833. 
17 
 
Q. When you see Juice get to the car, what side 
does he get on? 
A. He’s on the passenger side. 
Q. And in looking at them, are you facing the 
front of the car or the back of the car? 
A. I’m like the front, yeah, the front of the car. 
Q. Now, they’re at the car. When they’re 
getting to the car, do you see anything in their 
hands? 
A. Guns. 
Q. So we could be clear, does Muk have a gun 
in his hand? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does Juice have a gun in his hand? 
A. Yes. 
. . . 
Q. Okay. You said Muk’s on the driver’s side; 
Juice on the passenger. When they get up to the 
car, you said you saw the guns. What happens 
next? 
A. Then I heard the firing, pow, pow, pow. 
Q. Once the shooting stops, what does Muk do? 
What does Juice do? 
A. They run off. 
 
R.764–67; see also R.798 (testifying on cross examination 
that Johnson was on the “passenger side”). Williams reported 
being “right across the street,” which was, in her estimation, 
approximately 20 feet from the shooting when it occurred. 
R.826. 
 
 Williams also initially declined to give a statement to 
the police, although she eventually did. Williams agreed with 
18 
 
the prosecutor that, after she gave her statement, “certain 
things happen[ed] to [her] in the neighborhood that caused the 
police department to relocate [her].” R.773. Williams also 
testified that she relayed the same testimony at the 
preliminary hearing and at the first trial. 
 
Williams was impeached with her drug history. She 
admitted to having a 50-bag-a-day crack habit at the time of 
the murder, to having some cocaine in her system on the 
morning of the murder, and to possibly having cocaine in her 
system when she gave her statement to police. She was also 
questioned about her motivation in giving a statement to the 
police, including the fact that she had some “open cases”11 
and a “bench warrant on [her]” when she was interrogated. 
R.804. She also said that, at one of those interrogations, the 
police blamed her for the murder. Williams testified that she 
only “glance[d]” at the shooting, R.821, for what defense 
counsel characterized as a “mini-second,” R.819. Finally, 
Williams did not agree with defense counsel’s assertion that 
Johnson and Slaughter were “leaning into the car.” R.819. 
Instead, she reported them to be a “foot, foot and a half” 
away.12  R.822.  
 
                                              
11 Although defense counsel mentioned this criminal 
history, it was not explored in any detail. 
12 On redirect examination, the prosecutor spent some 
time attempting to establish just how far she thought the men 
were from the car. Apparently gesturing in the courtroom, the 
prosecutor asked her if “[Johnson] could touch [the car] if he 
wanted to,” to which Williams responded, “Yes.” R.834. 
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At the same time, Williams testified that there 
“[wasn’t] any question in [her] mind” about what she saw.13 
R.801.  
 
C. Mumin Slaughter 
The prosecution’s last witness was Mumin Slaughter, 
Johnson’s convicted co-defendant. Slaughter had given a 
statement to police implicating Johnson, and based on this 
cooperation and his anticipated testimony at Johnson’s re-
trial, his sentence had been vacated. However, at trial, he 
essentially refused to testify. The jury was then read portions 
of his statement over defense counsel’s objection and 
Slaughter’s repudiation of the statement itself. Because 
Johnson argues that the introduction of this statement violated 
his rights and substantially influenced the verdict, we recount 
not only the statement itself, but also the context within which 
it was introduced. 
 
Just before Slaughter was to testify, counsel appeared 
in the judge’s robing room, which was out of earshot of the 
jury. The prosecutor informed the trial judge that Slaughter 
was refusing to come upstairs to testify despite being 
subpoenaed. The trial judge stated that Slaughter had no Fifth 
Amendment privilege and the prosecutor agreed.14 Slaughter 
was then brought into the courtroom and called to the witness 
stand. 
                                              
13 At the time of the second trial, Williams had been 
clean for two years, except for occasional marijuana use. 
14 The trial court admitted later that this was error. 
App. 19 n.8. Because Slaughter’s sentence had been vacated, 
he was still entitled to exercise his privilege. Id. 
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Slaughter answered a few questions, confirming, for 
example, that he had been convicted of murder in the first 
trial, that his sentence had been vacated, and that he had 
spoken to the prosecutor that day and understood he would be 
held in contempt if he refused to testify. But he denied 
making the statement to police that implicated Johnson. When 
the prosecutor began to press Slaughter on that issue, he 
became uncooperative: 
 
Q. . . . Did you make a statement? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you, on August 26, 2005, in that period 
of time, did you sell drugs? 
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I don’t 
know why I’m sitting here. I don’t have 
nothing to say. 
THE COURT: You’ve been called as a 
witness, Mr. Slaughter. 
THE WITNESS: Well, I did not witness 
anything. 
THE COURT: Well, you’ve been called 
as a witness because your sentence was 
vacated, and I was the sentencing judge 
who gave you 25 to 50 years.  
. . . 
And we’re here now. And [the 
prosecutor] is going to ask you some 
questions.  
THE WITNESS: I have nothing to say, 
Your Honor. 
BY [THE PROSECUTOR]: 
Q. Good. Well, listen to me a little while longer. 
21 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: No. Overruled. It’s not 
your – you don’t represent him. 
BY [THE PROSECUTOR]: 
Q. Sir, did you serve a federal sentence? 
A. I plead the fifth. I don’t have nothing to say. 
THE COURT: You don’t have a Fifth 
Amendment privilege. 
THE WITNESS: Well, I’m just going to 
sit here with nothing to say, because you 
all can’t force me to do anything. 
 
R.847–48. At sidebar, counsel eventually agreed to attempt to 
contact Slaughter’s attorney and court recessed for the 
weekend.  
 
On Monday, counsel convened in the robing room 
outside the presence of the jury. Slaughter’s trial attorney 
appeared in court and explained Slaughter’s state of mind: 
 
Now that he’s realized – he says that he’s being 
asked to testify, he said he doesn’t want to do 
that. He says he doesn’t want to share the bad 
fortune that has descended on him in this case, 
having been improperly convicted, on 
somebody else. . . . 
 He talked about [how] he thought he was 
misle[d] by the District Attorney’s office in 
some fashion and reiterated that he didn’t want 
to bring any – any harm to Mr. Johnson, and at 
one point said that he really had no knowledge 
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of, you know, who, in fact, killed the officer in 
this case. 
 
R.862–63. The Court agreed with the Commonwealth, 
however, that Slaughter should be brought out again and held 
in contempt or resentenced if he refused to testify. The jury 
then returned to the courtroom. The prosecutor resumed his 
questioning, over defense counsel’s objection. Slaughter 
admitted to speaking to the prosecutor and his lawyer but 
answered little else.  
 
The Court then interrupted Johnson’s trial to 
resentence Slaughter. The jury was escorted from the 
courtroom again, as was Johnson, and Slaughter was seated in 
the defendant’s chair. A separate “sentencing hearing” was 
then conducted and recorded in a separate transcript under a 
different case number. See R.404–24. Ultimately, no new 
sentence was imposed; instead the parties probed Slaughter’s 
unwillingness to testify further. Slaughter testified: 
 
THE DEFENDANT: [Slaughter] . . . So I put a 
freaking statement together to try to help 
myself, to make him not go to trial. Now he 
want me to come up here and say he did do all 
this. 
THE COURT: Well, quite frankly, all you have 
to do is say you gave a statement and answer his 
questions. 
THE DEFENDANT: But if I do that, it’s going 
to make his trial look bad. The thing – he said 
he could help us get deals, just to help me. Now 
he want me to go up there and say all this. It’s 
going to mess up the trial and make him look 
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like a murderer. Nobody don’t believe us 
anyway that we didn’t do it. But being though I 
got 50 years, I wanted to help myself and make 
it back to my kids.  
Now he want me to sit here and say he 
did do this. I’m not willing to do that, because 
that’s going to make me a liar and that’s going 
to make me look bad, and I’m going to have 
that on my conscience. 
 
R.409. The prosecutor then recommended that given “this 
defendant’s attitude and not showing any type of remorse 
and, in fact, trying to undermine the truth-seeking process of 
the Commonwealth trying to bring some justice,” Slaughter 
should be resentenced in line with his original sentence. 
R.414. The transcript then ended at this point and Johnson’s 
trial resumed.15 
 
 The jury was brought out and the prosecutor resumed 
his questioning. After Slaughter remained essentially silent, 
the prosecutor presented Slaughter with his statement and, 
over Johnson’s attorney’s objections,16 the Court permitted 
                                              
15 The prosecutor indicated that if Slaughter continued 
to refuse to testify he would go “line by line” over Slaughter’s 
statement. R.411. The prosecutor’s apparent strategy was to 
use the testimony from the “sentencing hearing” to establish 
that Slaughter adopted the statement. 
16 The trial court denied defense counsel’s motion for a 
mistrial. Defense counsel had earlier indicated that he would 
make a motion for a mistrial on the grounds that Slaughter’s 
refusal to testify prevented him from cross examining 
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the prosecutor to put Slaughter’s statement on the overhead 
projector screen so that the jury could see it. Slaughter 
initially denied making the statement to police. He called the 
prosecutor a “liar,” a “sneak,” and “vicious.” R.895. After 
being asked if he had said, at the earlier “sentencing hearing,” 
that he had “put a freaking statement together,” R.898, 
Slaughter interjected in front of the jury: 
 
THE WITNESS: Listen, I got found guilty for a 
fucking murder that nobody don’t know who 
killed this man. They gave me 50 years and 
nobody said I did nothing. They trying to 
railroad us. They gave me 50 years. My own 
lawyer, even him told me I can never get back 
in court to get back to my kids or nothing. They 
said just say that you all did it and he won’t 
want to go to trial. You can get your 50 years 
back and he’ll take a statement – I mean, he’ll 
take a deal. He won’t want to go nowhere, 
because he be scared if I come out there with all 
these other liars saying that we did something.  
I didn’t have no choice. I didn’t know 
what to do. I was scared. A desperate man do 
desperate things. I tried it. Now, he didn’t go for 
it. He didn’t take it because he know me. He 
know that I was lying. He knew that I wouldn’t 
do this, because it was a lie. 
… 
Q. Does that mean he’s your friend? 
                                                                                                     
Slaughter, and thus that Johnson’s “right . . . to confrontation 
of a witness has now been destroyed.” R.881. 
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A. This is bullshit. You lie. You lie. 
Q. Answer the question. Is he your friend? 
A. This is bullshit. 
Q. Is he your friend? 
A. You trying to come in here and make like I 
really said he did this. 
 
R.899–900. Defense counsel then asked Slaughter a number 
of questions, most of which went unanswered, and finally, 
Slaughter was excused. 
 
The prosecutor subsequently called a detective who 
read Slaughter’s statement, line by line, to the jury. In the 
written statement, Slaughter indicated that he went by the 
nickname “Muk” and that he knew Johnson as “Juice;” that 
on the night of the murder he was on the corner of 20th and 
C.B. Moore selling crack; that Bowens had approached them 
to report the attempted solicitation by Flomo; that, when the 
car pulled up, “Juice pulled out his gun and started firing at 
the guy through the passenger side;” and that they both then 
ran off in different directions. R.922–24.  
 
Finally, at the close of the Commonwealth’s case, the 
prosecutor called the court reporter, who then read 
Slaughter’s earlier sentencing hearing transcript in its entirety 
to the jury. The Commonwealth then rested. 
 
Johnson presented only one witness, Deborah Bryant, 
who also testified in the first trial. Her testimony was read in 
by stipulation because she was unavailable. Although Bryant 
denied knowing anything about the murder at the time of the 
first trial, defense counsel impeached her at the first trial by 
reading portions of a statement, given to police at an earlier 
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time, claiming that two men by the name of “Peanut” and 
“Jeff” shot Flomo. R.1113.  
 
The jury was then instructed and retired to deliberate. 
During deliberations, the jury sent out two notes, to which the 
judge responded by sending back some of the evidence and 
giving them further instructions on the law.17 The jury then 
                                              
17 The jury first requested that certain evidence be sent 
back to the jury room including crime scene photographs, the 
demonstrative map of the intersection, and Slaughter’s 
written statement. The trial judge, however, did not permit the 
statement to be given to the jury and the jury did not ask for it 
again. 
Later in the day, the jury sent out another note 
containing two questions. Before responding, the judge re-
charged the jury on third degree murder. The judge then said:  
 
Question No. 1: “Can the defendant be 
convicted of murder parenthesis in the third 
degree even if we don’t believe he is the 
shooter?” If you have been convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is part of a 
conspiracy or is an accomplice, the answer to 
that question is, yes, he can be convicted of 
murder in the third degree even if you don’t 
believe he is the shooter. 
 
R.1292. The Judge had earlier instructed the jury on the 
definition of an accomplice. The judge continued: 
 
The second question is: “If we can’t agree on 
one of the charges, does that equal a hung jury 
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found Johnson guilty of third-degree murder and criminal 
conspiracy, and the Court sentenced Johnson to consecutive 
prison terms of 20 to 40 years and 10 to 20 years for the 
conspiracy. 
 
D. Post-trial Proceedings 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Johnson’s 
conviction. See Commonwealth. v. Johnson, 29 A.3d 821 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2011). On direct appeal, Johnson raised three 
claims, two of which are relevant here. First, he argued that 
the introduction of Slaughter’s statement violated his right to 
confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment. The Superior 
Court recognized that the “contents of Slaughter’s statement 
should not have been allowed in evidence because . . . their 
introduction violated [Johnson]’s right of confrontation,” R. 
Part 1, at 11, but nonetheless found the error harmless. 
Second, Johnson argued that the prosecutor violated his Due 
Process Clause rights when he called Slaughter as a witness, 
knowing that Slaughter would refuse to testify. The Superior 
Court concluded that both parties and the trial court were 
under a mistaken assumption that Slaughter no longer had a 
Fifth Amendment privilege, but that its introduction was not a 
Due Process Clause violation. It reasoned that calling 
                                                                                                     
for all the charges?” No, it does not. The 
charges are individual. 
 
R.1292. The jurors resumed deliberations and, twenty 
minutes later, returned a verdict of guilty against Johnson on 
both counts. 
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Slaughter was “not an improper attempt by the 
Commonwealth to create an inference of guilt by association 
between Johnson and Slaughter.” R. Part 1, at 17. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court then denied Johnson’s petition 
for allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 46 
A.3d 716 (Pa. 2012). 
 
Johnson filed a counseled petition for federal habeas 
corpus relief and raised three habeas claims: “(1) denial of 
due process by the prosecution’s deliberate elicitation of his 
co-defendant’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment before the 
jury, (2) denial of [his] Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation of witnesses, and (3) denial of due process by 
introduction of evidence falsely implying that Johnson 
threatened a witness.” Johnson v. Lamas, Civ. Action No. 12-
5156, 2013 WL 8744692, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2013). The 
Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation that 
habeas relief be denied on all three claims. Although the 
Magistrate Judge concluded that “federal courts do not owe 
deference to the state court’s harmless error conclusion,” the 
Magistrate Judge found that the evidence against Johnson 
“was strong enough, even apart from the evidence admitted in 
violation of [the Confrontation Clause], that the error did not 
cause actual prejudice.” Id. at *16. 
 
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 
Report and Recommendation, and issued a certificate of 
appealability as to Johnson’s Confrontation Clause claim. 
Johnson v. Lamas, Civ. Action No. 12-5156, 2014 WL 
3035671, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2014). We subsequently 
granted Johnson’s motion to expand the certificate of 
appealability to include the issue of “whether the District 
Court erred in denying Johnson’s claim that his due process 
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rights were violated when the Commonwealth called and 
examined a witness who invoked his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.” Order, dated May 4, 
2015. We now turn to these two questions. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the habeas 
corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253. 
Since the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, 
our review over the District Court’s denial of Johnson’s 
habeas petition is plenary. See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 
113 (3d Cir. 2009). At the same time, the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2254(d), 2254(e), requires that we “afford considerable 
deference to state courts’ legal and factual determinations,” 
Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
III. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CLAIM 
The introduction of Slaughter’s statement identifying 
Johnson as being the passenger’s side shooter after Slaughter 
refused to submit to cross-examination violated Johnson’s 
Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. 
This much the Commonwealth concedes. Therefore, the only 
question we must decide is whether this error was harmless. 
For the reasons that follow, we find that it was. 
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A. Harmless Error Standard 
To be entitled to habeas relief, a habeas petitioner must 
establish that the trial error “had [a] substantial and injurious 
effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht 
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Under this test, we 
may grant relief only if we have a “grave doubt” as to 
whether the error at trial had a substantial and injurious effect 
or influence. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015) 
(quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995)). In 
other words, “[t]here must be more than a ‘reasonable 
probability’ that the error was harmful.” Id. (quoting Brecht, 
507 U.S. at 637).  
 
Several factors guide our review of Confrontation 
Clause errors, including “the importance of the witness’ 
testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony 
was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence 
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on 
material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise 
permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the 
prosecution’s case.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 
684 (1986).  
 
 The Supreme Court has recently discussed the 
framework we must apply when a habeas petitioner claims 
that a state court erred in finding that a constitutional error 
was harmless. In Davis v. Ayala, the Court confirmed that the 
Brecht standard still governs our harmless error analysis on 
collateral review.18 135 S. Ct. at 2198 (“[Petitioner] must 
                                              
18 Davis v. Ayala was decided during the pendency of 
this appeal. We requested and received letter briefs from both 
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meet the Brecht standard . . . .”). However, where a state 
court has concluded that the error was harmless on direct 
review, the Supreme Court clarified that we must defer to that 
determination under AEDPA unless the state court 
unreasonably applied Chapman v. California.19 See id. at 
2198–99 (noting that where the state court decides 
harmlessness, AEDPA’s “highly deferential standards kick 
in”). Although the Supreme Court had previously held in Fry 
v. Pliler that Brecht “subsumes” AEDPA’s deference 
requirement, “[t]he Fry Court did not hold—and would have 
had no possible basis for holding—that Brecht somehow 
abrogate[d] the limitation on federal habeas relief that § 
2254(d) plainly sets out.” Id. at 2198 (quoting Fry v. Pliler, 
551 U.S. 112, 119–20 (2007)). Therefore, while Brecht 
“subsumes” AEDPA’s requirement such that we need not 
“‘formal[ly]’ apply both Brecht and ‘AEDPA/Chapman,’” 
                                                                                                     
parties addressing the “significance of [Ayala] for our 
harmless error analysis in this case, including but not limited 
to what consideration is due the state court’s harmless error 
analysis in view of Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007), 
Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003), and Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).” Letter to Counsel, dated 
Jan. 21, 2016. 
19 Chapman, which applies to the review of 
constitutional errors on direct review, requires that the state 
prove that a particular constitutional error is “harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18, 24 (1967). Conversely, in recognition of the concerns of 
finality, comity, and federalism, Brecht shifts the burden on 
collateral review to the petitioner to demonstrate that the error 
had a “substantial and injurious effect  . . . on the verdict.” 
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2198 (quoting O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 436).   
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AEDPA § 2254(d) nevertheless “sets forth a precondition to 
the grant of habeas relief.” Id. (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Fry, 551 U.S. at 119–20).20  
 
Under AEDPA, an application for habeas relief shall 
not be granted for any claim adjudicated “on the merits” in 
state court unless the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. 
2254(d)(1). A harmlessness determination constitutes an 
adjudication on the merits. See Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2198 
(holding that California supreme court harmlessness decision 
“undoubtedly constitute[d] an adjudication . . . ‘on the 
merits’”); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17–18 (2003). 
Consequently, a “federal court may not award habeas relief 
under § 2254 unless the harmlessness determination itself 
was unreasonable.” Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199 (quoting Fry, 
551 U.S. at 119). “And a state-court decision is not 
unreasonable if ‘fair-minded jurists could disagree on [its] 
correctness.’” Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 
86, 101 (2011)). Thus, a habeas petitioner must show that the 
state court’s harmless error determination “was so lacking in 
justification that there was an error well understood and 
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 
fairminded disagreement.”21 Id. (quoting Harrington, 562 
U.S. at 103). 
                                              
20 We therefore reject Johnson’s argument that “Ayala 
ha[d] no impact on this case,” Johnson Letter Br. 2, because 
Ayala did provide clarification that AEDPA is a 
“precondition” to any habeas relief, 135 S. Ct. at 2199. 
21 Johnson urges that “given the manner in which the 
Superior Court addressed the issues, no deference is owed 
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In sum, we must ask whether a fair-minded jurist could 
agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion that the 
introduction of Slaughter’s statement was harmless. If we find 
that she could, then Johnson “necessarily cannot satisfy” 
Brecht and we must give AEDPA deference to the Superior 
Court’s determination, even if we might decide the case 
differently were we to undertake de novo review. Ayala, 135 
S. Ct. at 2199. 
B. Application 
Here, the Superior Court concluded that the 
introduction of Slaughter’s statement was harmless because it 
“was merely cumulative of the testimony provided by 
Bowens and Williams.” R. Part 1, at 16. In so holding, it 
recounted Bowens’s and Williams’s identifications, id. at 12–
15, their impeachment, id. at 14, and some of the factors that 
rehabilitated their credibility, including that both 
eyewitnesses had known Johnson for years, that both 
                                                                                                     
under § 2254.” Johnson Letter Br. 2. We disagree. Although 
the Superior Court did not cite Chapman or Van Arsdall 
explicitly, it specifically considered whether the admission 
“prejudice[d] the defendant” and “could not have influenced 
the outcome of the case.” R. Part 1, at 11 (citing 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 668 A.2d 491, 506 (Pa. 1995)). As 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, AEDPA “does not 
require citation of [the Supreme Court’s] cases [nor] . . . even 
. . . awareness” of them, “so long as neither the reasoning nor 
the result . . . contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 
8 (2002). The Superior Court’s opinion is consistent with 
Chapman. 
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provided consistent identifications at the preliminary 
hearings, and were “unwavering in their identifications” 
during “vigorous cross-examination,”  id. at 15–16; 15 n.8. 
Although the District Court did not analyze whether it owed 
deference to this conclusion, it nonetheless concluded that the 
error was harmless under Brecht. 
 
Applying the relevant standard, we find that a 
reasonable jurist could conclude that the cumulative nature of 
Slaughter’s identification rendered its erroneous introduction 
harmless. The Commonwealth presented two key witnesses, 
Bowens and Williams, whose identifications fundamentally 
corroborated each other on points critical to the 
Commonwealth’s theory of the case. Williams corroborated 
that Bowens spoke to Johnson after being solicited by Flomo, 
a conversation that the Commonwealth theorized instigated 
the attack. Williams and Bowens, moreover, reported seeing 
the men standing near or leaning on the car before the 
shooting and, crucially, both saw Johnson standing at the 
passenger’s side of the car when they saw and heard gun 
shots. This consistent placement of Johnson at the passenger’s 
side of Flomo’s car is of particular significance here in light 
of Dr. Lieberman’s testimony that the “most immediately 
fatal” gunshot came from that location. Slaughter’s statement, 
therefore, added very little, if any, new substance to their 
consistent narratives. In this sense, the Superior Court 
reasonably concluded that the written statement given by 
Slaughter was cumulative of Bowens’s and Williams’s 
testimony. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 (directing courts 
to consider, among a list of non-exhaustive factors, whether 
the erroneously admitted statement was “cumulative” of other 
evidence). 
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Johnson responds that Bowens’s and Williams’s 
testimony, apart from Slaughter’s statement, left “serious 
doubt” as to Johnson’s guilt because Bowens and Williams 
were significantly impeached. Johnson Br. 22. Johnson points 
to their criminal and drug histories, proffers motives that 
might have biased their testimony, and highlights deficiencies 
in their perception of the shooting itself, particularly that each 
only glanced for a “mini-second.” Reply 12. We cannot say, 
however, after reviewing the whole record, that the Superior 
Court’s harmlessness determination, which discounted the 
effect of this impeachment on the jury, was objectively 
unreasonable such that no fair-minded jurist could agree with 
it. To the contrary, a fair-minded jurist could find that the 
introduction of the statement did not have a substantial effect 
on the verdict. 
 
We begin by noting that the jury heard rehabilitation 
testimony that bolstered Bowens’s and Williams’s credibility. 
It is true that Bowens—exhausted, and in tears—admitted to 
some doubt as to her identification. But despite this, Bowens 
affirmed on redirect that she had been telling the truth at this 
trial, at the previous trial, at the preliminary hearing, and 
when she gave her statement to the police. In fact, the jury 
actually heard several portions of these prior consistent 
identifications. And, unlike Bowens, Williams expressed no 
doubt whatsoever during cross-examination. Finally, as the 
Superior Court notes, Bowens and Williams had known 
Slaughter and Johnson for over five years, making it more 
likely that the jury could accept their identifications as 
accurate.22  
                                              
22 Indeed, Bowens and Williams were not simply 
casual passers-by of the murder scene. They were intimately 
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Bowens also responded specifically to charges of bias 
and fabrication by explaining that she overcame her earlier 
hesitancy to give a statement at the urging of her family, who 
believed she was in danger and needed help. Further, on 
redirect examination, Bowens repeatedly testified that she 
feared for her life and that she worried about reprisals. The 
jury also heard that Bowens and Williams needed to be 
relocated. In short, while “[these] reasons could easily be 
disbelieved,” Johnson Br. 23, the jury, which observed both 
witnesses throughout their testimony, could have, by the same 
token, determined that both were in fact more credible given 
their willingness to testify in the face of these fears. In light of 
this rehabilitative testimony, we cannot say that the Superior 
Court’s determination that Slaughter’s statement was 
harmless “was so lacking in justification” that we should 
refuse to give it AEDPA deference. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 
103. 
 
Next, Johnson directs our attention to the 
circumstances surrounding the introduction of Slaughter’s 
statement. Johnson argues that the prosecutor’s attempt to 
introduce Slaughter’s statement made it the “central focus” of 
the trial, and, as a convicted co-defendant, Slaughter’s refusal 
                                                                                                     
familiar with this block in North Philadelphia. Bowens and 
Williams knew each other and saw Johnson and Slaughter on 
a daily basis to buy drugs, which they often did immediately 
after turning a trick on the very same block. They knew the 
crack houses on that block and frequented them, and there 
were indications at trial that Johnson and Slaughter operated 
from those same houses. The jury could have considered this 
as well when assessing their credibility. 
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to testify on self-incrimination grounds amplified the 
statement’s effect. Reply 11. The Commonwealth replies that 
Slaughter’s testimony repudiating the statement in front of the 
jury undermined its impact. Although it is difficult to 
ascertain the exact effect this episode had on the verdict, we 
believe that certain aspects of Slaughter’s statement may have 
lessened the effect of the statement. Slaughter not only denied 
in front of the jury that he committed the murder, but also 
explained that he gave the statement implicating Johnson in 
the belief that it would cause Johnson not to go to trial. So 
while the corroborative aspects of Slaughter’s statement 
might have had some impact on the jury’s verdict, we cannot 
be certain that it had as damaging an effect as we typically 
find when a nontestifying co-defendant’s statement is 
admitted, unrepudiated and unchallenged.23 Cf. Adamson v. 
Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 259–61 (3d Cir. 2011); Vazquez v. 
Wilson, 550 F.3d 270, 283 (3d Cir. 2008). Similarly, while 
Confrontation Clause errors such as these present a risk of 
creating guilt by association, Slaughter blunted those 
inferences by denying Johnson’s guilt and even his own. 
Taken together with Bowens’s and Williams’s consistent 
eyewitness testimony and the forensic evidence, Johnson has 
not shown “more than a ‘reasonable possibility’” that the 
statement itself was harmful. Ayala, 135 S. Ct at 2198 
(quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).  
 
                                              
23 We note that even the trial court, upon hearing 
Slaughter’s adamant repudiation, wondered aloud to defense 
counsel in his robing room that defense counsel might 
actually want Slaughter’s testimony to be admitted. See 
R.886. 
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Further, we do not agree with Johnson’s argument that 
Slaughter’s statement was the Commonwealth’s only focus. 
Indeed, the prosecutor devoted roughly equivalent portions of 
his closing to reviewing Bowens’s and Williams’s testimony. 
As such, we are not persuaded that Slaughter’s statement had 
a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the 
verdict, even when we consider the circumstances 
surrounding its introduction. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 
(emphasis added). 
 
Finally, we disagree with Johnson’s argument that our 
prior Brecht harmless error cases compel a finding in his 
favor here. Johnson Br. 24 (citing, inter alia, Adamson). In 
Adamson, we concluded that a trial court’s Bruton error of 
permitting presentation of an accomplice’s inculpatory 
statements, without a limiting instruction, was not harmless 
under Brecht. 633 F.3d at 260. Johnson likens the evidence in 
his case to the evidence there, but they are not on all fours. In 
Adamson, the only evidence of the petitioner’s guilt, aside 
from the erroneously admitted statements of his accomplices, 
was the petitioner’s own confession, the validity of which he 
challenged extensively and credibly at trial. Id. at 261–62. 
Indeed, “[t]here were no eyewitness statements identifying 
[the petitioner] as taking part in the robbery . . . .” Id. at 261. 
Likewise, in Washington v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., the 
“only significant evidence against Washington,” aside from 
the statement admitted in violation of Bruton, was from a 
single co-conspirator who was not an eyewitness to the 
murders and who was impeached with “significant 
inconsistencies” in his story, in addition to his history of drug 
and alcohol abuse, “admitted heavy impairment from drugs” 
at the time of the murders, and his motivation to minimize his 
own role in the crime. 801 F.3d 160, 162, 171 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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Here, although they faced impeachment, there was not 
just one, but two eyewitnesses who were well-acquainted 
with Johnson and Slaughter and whose mutually 
corroborative testimony established that Johnson stood on the 
passenger’s side of the car. Cf. Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 
276 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding the admission of nontestifying 
co-defendant’s confession in violation of Sixth Amendment 
harmless where there was defendant’s allegedly coerced 
confession but also an eyewitness who testified that he was 
“absolutely certain” that defendant committed the crime). 
Thus, we do not have the same “doubt” that the verdict was 
substantially influenced by the error as we did in Adamson.24 
633 F.3d at 260. 
                                              
24 Johnson urges that the statement influenced the jury 
because the first trial ended in a hung jury as to Johnson, so 
its use in the second trial must have made a difference. We 
are not persuaded. As the District Court noted, a jury may 
hang for many reasons unrelated to the credibility of the 
eyewitness, including the “idiosyncratic views of a single 
juror.” United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 680 (2d Cir. 
2004). Johnson’s view that the only difference was 
Slaughter’s statement fails to take into account some of the 
nuances in presentation and focus that differed between the 
trials as well as the “simpl[e]” fact that “different juries may 
view the same facts and testimony differently.” Barker v. 
Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1101 (9th Cir. 2005).  
Moreover, as indicated by its question during 
deliberation and the trial court’s subsequent charge, the 
second jury may well have found Johnson guilty of third-
degree murder as an accomplice, even if they were not certain 
that he was the shooter. See R.1292; supra n.17. 
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In sum, we do not wish to diminish the importance of 
the right to confront witnesses, but because Slaughter’s 
statement was cumulative of Bowens’s and Williams’s 
largely consistent identifications, the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court did not act unreasonably in concluding that the error 
was harmless. Therefore, we conclude that Johnson 
“necessarily cannot satisfy” the Brecht requirement of 
showing that he was “actually prejudiced” by the state court’s 
error. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199. Accordingly, we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court on this aspect of Johnson’s 
appeal. 
 
IV. DUE PROCESS CLAIM 
Johnson also claims “a separate violation” of his due 
process right occurred when the prosecutor successfully 
insisted that Slaughter take the stand with full knowledge that 
the witness would assert his Fifth Amendment right. Johnson 
Br. 12. The Superior Court rejected this claim on the merits, 
as did the Magistrate Judge in her Report and 
Recommendation which the District Court adopted. Johnson, 
Civ. Action No. 12-5156, 2013 WL 8744692, at *14 n.14 
(noting that Johnson’s arguments rely on portions of Namet v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1963), involving “merely 
dicta”). 
 
We do not need to determine whether we owe 
deference to the Superior Court’s determination because we 
do not think the authorities Johnson relies upon clearly 
establish a due process violation. AEDPA permits habeas 
relief only where a state court unreasonably applies “clearly 
established federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. “[C]learly 
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established federal law” means “the governing legal principle 
or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the 
state court renders its decision.” Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of 
Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 280 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Lockyer v. 
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003)). Importantly, it only 
“refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the 
Supreme] Court’s decisions.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 
U.S. 652, 660–61 (2004) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). 
 
Here, Johnson relies on Namet v. United States, in 
which the Supreme Court considered a claim that a 
prosecutor’s questioning of two witnesses concerning their 
gambling relationship with the defendant with the knowledge 
that they would invoke their Fifth Amendment right 
constituted reversible error. 373 U.S. at 180. In that case, 
however, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s 
argument of “evidentiary trial error,” and only in dicta did it 
consider what type of showing might be necessary to state a 
constitutional claim on this theory. Id. at 185. The Supreme 
Court explicitly noted that “[n]o constitutional issues of any 
kind are presented.” Id. Accordingly, Namet is “off the table” 
for habeas purposes. Early, 537 U.S. at 10 (holding that 
petitioner’s authorities, which did not “purport[] to interpret 
any provision of the Constitution,” could not provide clearly 
established federal law within the meaning of § 2254).25  
                                              
25 Johnson also relies on Douglas v. Alabama, 380 
U.S. 415, 420 (1965) (“The circumstances are therefore such 
that ‘inferences from a witness’ refusal to answer added 
critical weight to the prosecution’s case in a form not subject 
to cross-examination, and thus unfairly prejudiced the 
defendant.’” (quoting Namet, 373 U.S. at 187)). Douglas, 
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We note also that even if such a right were clearly 
established, there is considerable uncertainty in the factual 
record as to when—and to what extent— the prosecutor knew 
Slaughter would exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege. The 
prosecutor’s foreshadowing of Slaughter’s testimony in his 
opening statement does not necessarily indicate that the 
prosecutor knew Slaughter would invoke his right to not 
testify, as much as it indicates the prosecutor’s awareness that 
Slaughter might attempt to distance himself from the 
statement. Moreover, other than the trial court’s unprompted 
reference outside the presence of the jury, the first mention by 
Slaughter that he would invoke his Fifth Amendment right 
occurred while he was on the stand.  
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
rejection of Johnson’s “separate” due process claim as well. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the 
District Court’s order. 
                                                                                                     
however, considered only a Confrontation Clause claim, and 
the cited language does not establish an independent due 
process claim. At most, Douglas supports Johnson’s 
argument that we should consider Slaughter’s refusal to 
testify when analyzing the prejudice that flowed from the 
Confrontation Clause violation, an analysis we undertake 
above. We have analyzed Johnson’s other cited authorities 
and have similarly concluded that they do not clearly 
establish such a right as required under § 2254. 
